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 Academics have long argued that the collection of tax 
revenue lays a foundation for the development of accountable, 
democratic and responsive governance. Taxation supports the 
relationship between a nation and the citizens and a government 
seeking greater tax revenue is likely to face demands from these 
citizens for reciprocal services and expanded accountability.1 As 
more and more citizens complain about globalization,2 it is 
sensible to ask why it isn’t working as anticipated for such large 
numbers of people and how taxation contributes to this growing 
discontent. 
 Despite the growing academic and public attention, the 
understanding of the relationship between globalization, 
democracy and taxation in developing nations has remained 
limited. Research has provided an increasing but still 
fragmented amount of evidence on the specific links between 
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taxation, globalization and governance.3 This paper seeks to 
help fill the gap through an examination of the links between 
taxation, globalization and democracies in the developing world. 
 
II. GLOBALIZATION AND TARIFFS 
 
 How would globalization trigger a revenue crisis in a 
substantial number of developing nations? The answer lies in 
how the governments of the developing nations that joined the 
wave of globalization raised their money prior to the 1990s.4 
These governments collected extensive revenues from taxes on 
imports and exports. Tariffs on consumer goods produced 
domestically on average accounted for 40 percent of all tax 
revenues in developing economies and 35 percent in lower, 
middle-income economies. Combined, they comprised almost 
33 percent of tax revenues in the full sample of developing 
economies.5 
 Reliance on trade taxes continued through the early 
1990s, mainly because they are generally easy to collect. Trade 
taxes include import duties, export duties, import monopolies, 
export profits, exchange profits and exchange taxes. They can 
be monitored and solicited at centralized locations, such as 
border areas and don’t require a complex bureaucracy to 
manage.6 
 Starting in the late 1980s, after the Latin American debt 
crisis, there was a growing movement towards opening up 
international markets. In order to obtain structural adjustment 
packages, nations would have to become members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), which encouraged the lowering of 
tariffs. For many developing nations, this lowering of tariffs led 
to a loss of a primary source of tax revenue.7 
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 Developing nations now needed to replace almost a third 
of their tax revenue with domestic taxes, which are more 
difficult to collect. Many had to increase income taxes on 
individuals and corporations and implement a value-added tax 
(VAT). The VAT involves fees at various level of productions 
and can be quite complicated to collect. Broadening income 
taxes is even more difficult since a large percentage of 
individuals and corporations in poor nations are logistically 
difficult to tax. Inefficient bureaucracies, untrained staff and 
weak technologies only amplify the problem of domestic tax 
collection. Besides, governments feel the pressure to keep 
domestic income taxes low so that domestic firms can survive in 
the global market competition. All of this can lead to a tax 
revenue shock for developing nations with poor revenue streams 
to begin with.8 
 
 
III. GLOBALIZATION AND TAX HAVENS 
 
 The basic tax problems faced by the governments of 
developing nations are similar to those faced by tax collectors 
anywhere. Governments want to tax the profits of corporations 
and wealthy individuals, while many of these potential taxpayers 
want to hide as much of their profits and wealth as possible. The 
challenges of taxing global financial transactions are even more 
difficult because of the complexity of the global tax system.9 
 In a world where capital can flow easily across national 
borders, multinational corporations and wealthy individuals find 
numerous opportunities to hide their wealth from their own 
national governments. Effective global cooperation could 
overcome the challenges national governments face in collecting 
revenues from multinational corporations and wealthy 
individuals but such cooperation has been limited in practice. 
48 / Vol 40 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
Technically, there is no global tax system. Instead, there is a 
network of overlapping national arrangements, principles 
endorsed by global organizations, bilateral treaties, international 
agreements in addition to custom and practice. The effectiveness 
of these arrangements depends on willing compliance, which 
changes based on the political environment at the time.10 
 The so-called rules governing global taxation have 
largely been made by the richer and more powerful nations. This 
means that the rules have been broadly designed to benefit their 
creators and the powerful interests located within their arenas. 
Initial debates about the right to tax focused on the difference 
between “residence nations” and “source nations”; that is, where 
the corporate entity was owned (residence) and where it sourced 
its profits (source). The rules were designed to enhance the 
taxing rights of those who were based in the residence nations. 
These rules were also applied to the arrangements for taxing 
wealthy individuals. Wealthy individuals from both rich and 
poor nations began to place their wealth in foreign bank accounts 
in order to avoid the reach of their national governments.11 
 While international tax rules may be unequal, they 
usually do not authorize tax abuse; however, they do create 
opportunities for tax abuse. While tax secrecy has always been 
around, in the last half century it has been frequently facilitated 
by a network of offshore financial centers, more popularly 
known as “tax havens.” Tax havens are legal jurisdictions 
offering a combination of extreme secrecy, limited regulation 
and low tax rates for foreign corporations and individuals. These 
tax havens have been achieved with bank secrecy laws designed 
to prevent the sharing of information about bank clients with 
national authorities.12 
 The use of tax havens is basically a beggar-thy-neighbor 
strategy. In tax havens, financial institutions achieve economic 
gain by offering services to foreign capital and the do so by 
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undermining tax laws elsewhere around the globe. The largest 
recipients of offshore financial wealth are Switzerland, the 
United States, Luxembourg and Singapore. Table 1 reveals the 
top 40 nations in the Financial Secrecy Index.13 
  
Table 1: Top 40 Nations in the Financial Secrecy Index14 
Rank Jurisdiction Rank Jurisdiction 
1 Switzerland 21 Canada 
2 USA 22 Macao 
3 Cayman Islands 23 United Kingdom 
4 Hong Kong 24 Cyprus 
5 Singapore 25 France 
6 Luxembourg 26 Ireland 
7 Germany 27 Kenya 
8 Taiwan 28 China 
9 United Arab Emirates 29 Russia 
10 Guernsey 30 Turkey 
11 Lebanon 31 Malaysia 
12 Panama 32 India 
13 Japan 33 South Korea 
14 Netherlands 34 Israel 
15 Thailand 35 Austria 
16 British Virgin Islands 36 Bermuda 
17 Bahrain 37 Saudi Arabia 
18 Jersey 38 Liberia 
19 Bahamas 38 Marshall Islands 
20 Malta 40 Philippines 
 
 While it is generally well known that Switzerland is a 
major tax haven – and has been for quite some time – not as 
many are aware that the USA is ranked second right after 
Switzerland when it comes to financial secrecy. In the U.S., the 
largest recipient of offshore financial wealth is New York; 
however, Delaware is the easiest place globally to create a 
secretive corporate entity. It is not surprising that many global 
entities will register a secretive corporation with Delaware and 
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then deposit their funds in New York banks, where the funds 
will be kept secret.15 
 It should be noted Switzerland may be the largest 
destination for global financial wealth in terms of bank accounts. 
A lot of wealth is also transferred to tax havens in the form of 
stocks and bonds and tangible assets such as art, jewelry, 
precious gems and other luxury goods that are difficult to 
track.16 This makes the loss of potential tax revenue even more 
potent. 
 The numbers associated with the transfer of wealth to tax 
havens is large. One research estimate is that $8 trillion of 
personal financial wealth is held in tax havens and this number 
is considered to be very conservative17 (Zucman 2014). This 
estimate does not include tangible assets such as art, jewelry or 
other movable property. Other estimates of total global wealth 
held in tax havens are $32 trillion and implies that about 20% of 
total global wealth is held in tax havens.18 
 Meanwhile, the percentage of total global wealth 
transferred to tax havens is higher for Africa. The estimate is that 
Africans hold $500 billion in offshore financial wealth, which 
amounts to 30% of all financial wealth held by Africans and 
once again, this is a conservative estimate. The fact that there is 
mounting evidence of massive sums of foreign wealth 
transferring into global property markets, often through shell 
companies, makes this higher percentage more plausible.19  
 So how much tax revenue is lost by African 
governments? There are studies that assume that about 80% to 
95% of offshore wealth remains unreported to governments, 
which means that financial returns such as capital gains, 
dividends and interest go untaxed by national governments. 
Estimates are that African governments lose about $15 billion to 
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$45 billion annually in tax revenues.20 This has led to a 
globalization-induced tax revenue loss. 
 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBALIZATION-
INDUCED TAX REVENUE LOSS 
 
 The globalization-induced tax revenue loss (GTRL) 
permanently reduces the revenue supply from longstanding 
sources, such as tariffs and income taxes.21 As expected, the first 
big shock for developing nations occurred in the 1990s, 
immediately after initial trade reforms and World Trade 
Organization accession. On average, trade increased by 24 
percent while trade tax revenues fell by 40 percent between 1990 
and 2010.22 
 This GTRL poses serious challenges for developing 
nations. In addition to losing important tax revenue sources, 
overall revenue levels in developing nations have always been 
suboptimal. They have hovered around 22% of gross domestic 
product compared with 33% of developed nations. This has led 
developing nations to implement deficit spending policies, 
which have decreased the quality of public goods and services.23 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
estimates that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 
requires developing nations to raise their current tax/gross 
domestic product ratios by close to 4 percentage points.24 
 Nations such as the Philippines, Nicaragua and India 
have made great progress in global market expansion but 
minimal improvements in tax revenue.25 In particular, 
undeclared revenue is costing India billions of dollars. The 
informal Indian economy is very extensive and paid mostly in 
cash; therefore, it is difficult to tax. One report suggests that the 
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informal Indian economy is 23 percent of its gross domestic 
product for a total of over $270 billion.26 
In order to recover some of the lost tax revenue, India launched 
tax amnesty schemes and a widely criticized “demonetization,” 
where 500- and 1,000-rupee notes were removed from 
circulation with no warning, just to uncover this untaxed 
revenue.27 According to the Indian government, under one 
amnesty program, nearly 700,000 people were contacted and 
offered immunity if they came forward and paid the appropriate 
taxes and penalty. Included among those who came forward 
were Mumbai street food vendors who declared almost $7.5 
million in untaxed assets. Within 4 months of this amnesty, 
64,275 declarations were made according to the Indian finance 
minister, Arun Jaitley. This amnesty unearthed $9.5 billion in 
undeclared income but this isn’t much considering the size of 
the informal Indian economy.28 
 Then again, not all developing nations are suffering from 
the GTRL. Government revenue levels appear to be rising in a 
subset of developing nations that includes China, Tunisia and 
Morocco. This group of developing nations show improvements 
in trade and total revenue.29 How are these developing nations 
doing this? Recovering from a GTRL requires the successful 
generation of domestic tax revenues so how are these developing 
nations doing that? 
 
V. THE CHALLENGE OF DOMESTIC TAX 
BARGAINING 
 
 The GTRL, which struck the hardest in the 1990s, 
requires governments to immediately replenish their domestic 
treasuries. If free global trade can’t increase the tax revenues of 
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many developing nations, then what can? The answer is 
domestic tax reform. 
 A lot of developing nations have been facing obstacles 
substituting their tariff (trade tax) revenues with domestic tax 
revenues. On average, low- and lower- middle-income nations 
lost 2.83% of gross domestic product in trade tax revenues while 
gaining only 2.4% of gross domestic product from domestic tax 
revenues. Overall, the marginal increases in domestic taxes in 
many developing nations have been unable to offset the loss of 
trade tax revenues over time.30 
 When it comes to tax revenue policy, today’s developing 
nations are facing an entirely different set of circumstances than 
their predecessors did. Today’s developed nations faced a 
different state of affairs when they abandoned trade taxes in the 
19th century. These developed nations had greater latitude to 
implement tax reforms both domestically and globally. They 
adopted tax reforms in response to their own domestic 
calculations, rather than to external pressures from other nations. 
Today’s developed nations had strong state capacity, a more 
advanced tax bureaucracy and an abundant supply of public 
goods; therefore, domestic tax bargaining was more expedient 
for them.31 
 Another distinction is that today’s developed nations had 
strong capacity to tax before they became democracies. In pre-
modern Europe, the powerful authorities imposed and enforced 
tax compliance before the establishment of representative 
institutions. The authoritarian capacity to tax existed prior to 
effective tax bargaining in developed nations. This is different 
from today’s developing nations that are trying to democratize 
and impose domestic taxes all in the face of inefficient state 
capacity.32 
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 In political science, a generally accepted premise is that 
leaders are incentivized to remain in power.33 The difference 
across regimes depends on how adept leaders are at retaining 
power while pursuing goals, such as implementing unpopular 
tax reforms in the face of globalization. Democratic leaders 
depend on voters.34 Non-democratic leaders basically need to 
satisfy a small group of loyal resource-providers, which they do 
with tax breaks and exemptions. Of course, nondemocratic 
leaders must also prevent the general population from rebelling 
against the needed tax reforms.35 
 
VI. THE UNDERMINING OF DEMOCRACY 
 
 In general, leaders have two main strategies for 
overcoming the public’s resistance to taxes: (1) quasi-voluntary 
compliance; and (2) coercion.36 Taxpayers are more likely to 
pay taxes when they are confident in their leaders and believe 
that the tax system is fair. The taxpaying public is confident in 
their leaders when the leaders deliver their promised benefits 
such as solid infrastructure and public goods. Simply put, 
taxpayers support higher taxes when they receive competent 
government services. It is quasi-voluntary compliance because 
the choice to comply is backed up by enforcement and/or the 
expectation that others will also comply.37 
 When leaders can’t provide competent government 
services, the taxpayers are less likely to pay taxes; therefore, 
quasi-voluntary compliance becomes more difficult to achieve. 
When leaders can’t collect taxes through quasi-voluntary 
compliance, they may have to resort to coercion, which 
undermines democracy.38 
 There are two basic nondemocracies: (1) liberal 
authoritarian regimes and (2) conservative authoritarian 
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regimes.39 Dictators in liberal regimes usually coopt opposing 
groups by offering some social benefits in exchange for higher 
taxes. Dictators in conservative regimes usually don’t cooperate 
with the opposition and engage in coercion to prevent 
rebellion.40 
 When taxpayers feel that a new tax policy is no longer in 
their favor, quasi-voluntary compliance unravels.41 During the 
recession of the early 1990s, many governments simultaneously 
levied new taxes on businesses. But with more global 
competition and tax havens, businesses were well positioned to 
demand tax cuts. Businesses with fewer resources in particular 
demanded tax decreases in order to stay afloat.42 
 When a nation has fewer resources to bargain with, 
quasi-voluntary compliance tends to unravel immediately. 
During a 2013 nationwide protest in Brazil, 26-year old Jairo 
Domingos said, “They don’t invest in education, they don’t 
invest in infrastructure, and they keep putting makeup on the city 
to show to the world that we can host the World Cup and 
Olympics,” referring to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic 
Games. “We work four months of the year just to pay taxes and 
we get nothing in return.”43 When citizens have low confidence 
in their government, collecting much-needed domestic tax 
revenue becomes an extreme challenge. 
 When a nation needs more tax revenue after a revenue 
shock and quasi-voluntary compliance is a challenge, an 
alternative means of collecting tax revenue would be through 
state coercion.44 Coercion can be implemented through specific 
forms such as passing tax laws by executive decree, harsh 
penalties for tax evaders and collectors and even the use of 
arbitrary and extreme punishments.45 For example, tax 
collectors have been executed in China for accepting bribes in 
exchange for tax evasion.46 
56 / Vol 40 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 Empirical analysis suggests that authoritarian nations are 
more effective than democratic nations in raising domestic 
revenue after trade tax liberalization.47 Bastiaens and Rudra 
(2018) examined the changes in trade tax revenues and domestic 
tax revenues in 133 developing nations between 1990 and 
2012.48 The results are summarized in Table 2: 
  
Table 2: Effect of Declining Trade Tax Revenue on  
               Domestic Tax Revenue49  
Type of Government Empirical Results Interpretation 
Democracies Decrease in trade tax 
revenue leads to 
decrease in domestic 
tax revenue 
Unsuccessful domestic 
tax revenue reform as 
citizens resist higher 
domestic taxes 
Nondemocracies Decrease in trade tax 
revenue leads to 
increase in domestic 
tax revenue 
Successful domestic tax 
reform generates higher 
tax revenue as 
governments overcome 
citizens’ resistance to 
higher domestic taxes 
 
 Compared to democracies, nondemocracies show 
consistent improvement in collecting goods and service tax 
revenues after trade taxes are liberalized.50 When trade taxes are 
reduced or even eliminated, democracies face an uphill battle 
when it comes to replacing the lost trade tax revenues with the 
collection of more domestic tax revenues. This can destabilize 
democracies, particularly in developing nations.51 
 Nondemocracies in developing nations have two 
advantages when it comes to governance. One, they can impose 
unwanted reform on the population and enforce it by severe 
punishment.52 Two, they don’t need to win the confidence of the 
entire population; they only have to win and maintain the 
confidence of a small group of loyalists by providing loopholes, 
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subsidies or other exceptions to the law. Furthermore, 
nondemocracies can buy support from external groups as well.53 
 Democracies in developing nations are limited in dealing 
with taxpayers who resist higher taxes, especially when those 
taxpayers don’t believe that the democratic governments will 
use the tax money in an effective way. Democratic governments 
can’t use fear and coercion to impose tax reform on the 
population and catering to internal as well as external elite 
groups will only make things worse.54 When the citizens of 
democracies have low confidence in their governments, they are 
more likely to rebel against these governments and this rebellion 
could range from tax evasion to protesting and ultimately, to the 




 While academics have been arguing that tax revenue is 
the foundation for a democratic society, little attention has been 
given to how global tax policies affect democracies around the 
world. More research is needed to examine how global tax 
liberalization affects the domestic tax collection systems in 
sovereign nations, particularly those with developing 
economies. 
 Recent research suggests that when trade taxes (tariffs) 
are liberalized, nondemocracies do a better job than democracies 
do of replacing the lost trade tax revenues with domestic tax 
revenues. Since democracies can’t easily coerce the population 
into accepting the imposition of more taxes, they may be 
undermined by the loss of trade tax revenues, especially when 
the population has low confidence in their democratic leaders. 
 The so-called global tax policies have largely been 
created by the richer and more powerful nations so eliminating 
global trade taxes favors the wealthier nations at the expense of 
58 / Vol 40 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
the poorer nations. Before implementing a global tax policy, the 
global creators should consider how the policy will affect the 
democracies in developing nations. Any global tax policy that 
places democracies in danger should not be implemented 
because when democracies are in danger, global stability could 
wind up in danger as well. 
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